הִלְוָהוּ עַל הַמַּשְׁכּוֹן קָתָנֵי! אֶלָּא לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן – שֶׁהִלְוָהוּ מָעוֹת, כָּאן – שֶׁהִלְוָהוּ פֵּירוֹת.

teach the same phrase: One who lent to another based on collateral, which indicates that the collateral was given at the time of the loan? Rather, the Gemara proposes a different resolution: It is not difficult. Here, the baraita is referring to a case where he lent him money, whereas there, the mishna is referring to a situation where he lent him produce. Since produce will spoil, the lender benefits from the deal, as he will receive fresher produce in return. Therefore, he is considered a paid bailee for the collateral.

וְהָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: הִלְוָהוּ מָעוֹת – שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם, הִלְוָהוּ פֵּירוֹת – שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר. מִכְלָל דִּלְתַנָּא קַמָּא לָא שָׁנֵי לֵיהּ!

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But from the fact that the latter clause of the mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: One who lent another money is an unpaid bailee, whereas one who lent another produce is a paid bailee, by inference you can conclude that according to the first tanna there is no difference between one who lends money and one who lends produce. If so, the proposed resolution does not fit the text.

כּוּלַּהּ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, וְחַסּוֹרֵי מִיחַסְּרָא וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: הִלְוָהוּ עַל הַמַּשְׁכּוֹן – שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר, בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים – שֶׁהִלְוָהוּ פֵּירוֹת, אֲבָל הִלְוָהוּ מָעוֹת – שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם. שֶׁרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: הִלְוָהוּ מָעוֹת – שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם, הִלְוָהוּ פֵּירוֹת – שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר.

The Gemara responds: The entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and the mishna is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: One who lent to another based on collateral is a paid bailee. In what case is this statement said? When he lent him produce. But if he lent him money, he is an unpaid bailee. As Rabbi Yehuda says: One who lent another money is an unpaid bailee with regard to the collateral, whereas one who lent produce is a paid bailee.

אִי הָכִי, קָמָה לַהּ מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. אֶלָּא מְחַוַּורְתָּא מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: If that is so, it turns out that the mishna is established not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. This is problematic, as most of the Sages of the mishna were Rabbi Akiva’s students, and anonymous mishnayot are generally presumed to follow his rulings. Rather, it is clear that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

לֵימָא בִּדְלָא שָׁוֵי מַשְׁכּוֹן שִׁיעוּר זוּזֵי, וּבְדִשְׁמוּאֵל קָא מִיפַּלְגִי. דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הַאי מַאן דְּאוֹזְפֵיהּ אַלְפָּא זוּזֵי לְחַבְרֵיהּ וְאַנַּח לֵיהּ קַתָּא דְמַגְּלָא עִילָּוַיְיהוּ, אֲבַד קַתָּא דְמַגְּלָא – אֲבַדוּ אַלְפָּא זוּזֵי.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer applies only in a case where the collateral is not equal to the monetary value of the loan, and they disagree with regard to a statement of Shmuel. As Shmuel says: With regard to one who lends one thousand dinars to another and the borrower puts before the lender as collateral for the loan the handle of a sickle, which is worth only a small fraction of the loan, nevertheless, if the sickle is lost, the thousand dinars are lost. The Gemara is suggesting that Rabbi Akiva would agree with this ruling, whereas Rabbi Eliezer would disagree with it.

אִי בִּדְלָא שָׁוֵי מַשְׁכּוֹן שִׁיעוּר זוּזֵי – דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לֵית לְהוּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל, וְהָכָא בִּדְשָׁוֵי שִׁיעוּר זוּזֵי, וְקָא מִיפַּלְגִי בִּדְרַבִּי יִצְחָק.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: If the case is one where the collateral is not equal to the amount of money constituting the loan, everyone holds that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. But here the dispute is referring to a situation where the collateral does equal the amount of the money constituting the loan, and they disagree with regard to a statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak.

דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: מִנַּיִן לְבַעַל חוֹב שֶׁקּוֹנֶה מַשְׁכּוֹן, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וּלְךָ תִּהְיֶה צְדָקָה״. אִם אֵינוֹ קוֹנֶה מַשְׁכּוֹן, צְדָקָה מְנָא לֵיהּ? מִכָּאן לְבַעַל חוֹב שֶׁקּוֹנֶה מַשְׁכּוֹן.

As Rabbi Yitzḥak says: From where is it derived that a creditor acquires collateral given to him and is considered its owner as long as the item is in his possession? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “You shall return the pledge to him when the sun goes down that he may sleep in his garment, and bless you; and it shall be a righteousness for you before the Lord your God” (Exodus 24:13). Rabbi Yitzḥak infers: If the creditor does not acquire the collateral, then from where is the righteousness involved in returning it? In this case, the creditor would not be giving up anything of his own. From here it is derived that a creditor acquires the collateral.

וְתִסְבְּרָא? אֵימוֹר דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק בְּמִשְׁכְּנוֹ שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁעַת הַלְוָאָתוֹ, אֲבָל מִשְׁכְּנוֹ בִּשְׁעַת הַלְוָאָתוֹ – מִי אָמַר?

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: And can you understand it that way? You can say that Rabbi Yitzḥak stated this halakha in a case where he took his collateral not at the time of his loan but at a later stage, in order to collect his debt. But did Rabbi Yitzḥak say this ruling in a situation where he took his collateral at the time of his loan?

אֶלָּא מִשְׁכְּנוֹ שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁעַת הַלְוָאָתוֹ – כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִית לְהוּ דְּרַבִּי יִצְחָק. וְהָכָא בְּמִשְׁכְּנוֹ בִּשְׁעַת הַלְוָאָתוֹ, וּבְשׁוֹמֵר אֲבֵידָה קָא מִיפַּלְגִי. דְּאִיתְּמַר: שׁוֹמֵר אֲבֵידָה, רַבָּה אָמַר: כְּשׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם, רַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר: כְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר.

Rather, if he took his collateral not at the time of his loan, everyone holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak. And here it is discussing a case where he took his collateral at the time of his loan, and Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree with regard to the case of a bailee of a lost item. As it was stated that amora’im disagreed concerning the responsibility of the bailee for a lost item. If someone found a lost item and it is subsequently lost or stolen from him, what responsibility does he bear toward the owner? Rabba said: This individual is considered to be like an unpaid bailee. Rav Yosef said: He is like a paid bailee.

לֵימָא דְּרַב יוֹסֵף תַּנָּאֵי הִיא? לָא, בְּשׁוֹמֵר אֲבֵידָה – דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִית לְהוּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף, וְהָכָא

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the opinion of Rav Yosef is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im. There is no question that Rabba’s opinion is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im, as Rabbi Akiva’s opinion cannot be reconciled with his ruling: If one who takes collateral for his loan is considered a paid bailee, the same certainly applies to one who goes out of his way to safeguard a lost item. The Gemara is asking whether there is any way to explain Rav Yosef’s ruling in accordance with the opinions of both tanna’im, or if he must accept that Rabbi Eliezer disputes his opinion. The Gemara responds: No, it is possible with regard to a bailee for a lost item that everyone holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef, even Rabbi Eliezer. And here, in the baraita,