עַד דַּאֲתָא – אִגְּנִיב. אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב פָּפָּא חַיְּיבִינְהוּ. אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן לְרַב פָּפָּא: הָא שְׁמִירָה בִּבְעָלִים הִיא! אִכְּסִיף. לְסוֹף אִיגַּלַּאי מִילְּתָא דְּהַהִיא שַׁעְתָּא שִׁכְרָא הֲוָה שָׁתֵי.

Before he came back it was stolen. They came before Rav Pappa, who deemed them liable to pay. The Sages said to Rav Pappa: This is a case of safeguarding with the owners. Rav Pappa was embarrassed. Ultimately it was discovered that at that time the cloak owner was drinking beer and not baking, and therefore this was not a case of safeguarding with the owners.

הָנְהוּ בֵּי תְרֵי דַּהֲווֹ קָא מְסַגּוּ בְּאוֹרְחָא, חַד אֲרִיךְ וְחַד גּוּצָא. אֲרִיכָא רְכִיב חֲמָרָא וַהֲוָה לֵיהּ סְדִינָא, גּוּצָא מִיכַּסֵּי סַרְבָּלָא וְקָא מְסַגֵּי בְּכַרְעֵיהּ. כִּי מְטוֹ לְנַהֲרָא, שַׁקְלֵיהּ לְסַרְבָּלֵיהּ וְאוֹתְבֵיהּ עִילָּוֵי חֲמָרָא, וְשַׁקְלֵיהּ לִסְדִינֵיהּ דְּהָהוּא וְאִיכַּסִּי בֵּיהּ. שַׁטְפוּהּ מַיָּא לִסְדִינֵיהּ.

The Gemara relates: An incident occurred with these two people who were going on the way, one of whom was tall and one of whom was short. The tall one was riding on a donkey and he had a sheet. The short one was covered with a woolen cloak [sarbela] and was walking on foot. When the short one reached a river, he took his cloak and placed it on the donkey in order to keep the cloak dry, and he took that tall man’s sheet and covered himself with it, and the water washed away his sheet.

אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא, חַיְּיבֵיהּ. אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן לְרָבָא: אַמַּאי? שְׁאֵלָה בִּבְעָלִים הִיא! אִכְּסִיף. לְסוֹף אִיגַּלַּאי מִילְּתָא דִּבְלָא דַּעְתֵּיהּ שַׁקְלֵיהּ, וּבְלָא דַּעְתֵּיהּ אוֹתְבֵיהּ.

The tall man came for judgment before Rava, who deemed the short man liable to pay for the sheet. The Rabbis said to Rava: Why did you deem him liable to pay? This is a case of borrowing with the owners present. Rava was embarrassed. Ultimately, it was discovered that the short man took the sheet without the tall man’s knowledge and placed it back without his knowledge, and therefore this was not borrowing, but theft.

הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דְּאוֹגַר לֵיהּ חֲמָרָא לְחַבְרֵיהּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: חֲזִי, לָא תֵּיזוֹל בְּאוֹרְחָא דִּנְהַר פְּקוֹד דְּאִיכָּא מַיָּא, זִיל בְּאוֹרְחָא דְנַרֶשׁ דְּלֵיכָּא מַיָּא. אָזֵיל בְּאוֹרְחָא דִּנְהַר פְּקוֹד וּמִית חַמְרָא. כִּי אֲתָא, אָמַר: אִין, בְּאוֹרְחָא דִּנְהַר פְּקוֹד אֲזַלִי, וּמִיהוּ לֵיכָּא מַיָּא.

The Gemara relates that there was a certain man who rented a donkey to another. The owner said to the renter: Look, do not go on the path of Nehar Pekod, where there is water and the donkey is likely to drown. Instead, go on the path of Neresh, where there is no water. The renter went on the path of Nehar Pekod and the donkey died. When he came back, he said: Yes, I went on the path of Nehar Pekod; but there was no water there, and therefore the donkey’s death was caused by other factors.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: מָה לֵיהּ לְשַׁקֵּר, אִי בָּעֵי אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנָא בְּאוֹרְחָא דְנַרֶשׁ אֲזַלִי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: ״מָה לִי לְשַׁקֵּר״ בִּמְקוֹם עֵדִים – לָא אָמְרִינַן.

Rava said: The renter’s claim is accepted, due to the reasoning of: Why should he lie? In other words, if this man wanted to lie, he could have told the donkey’s owner: I went on the path of Neresh, as the owner instructed. Abaye said to Rava: We do not say the principle of: Why would I lie, in a place where there are witnesses. Since witnesses can be summoned to establish conclusively whether there was water along the path of Nehar Pekod, the reasoning that the renter could have stated a different claim is not employed.

״שְׁמוֹר לִי״, וְאָמַר לוֹ ״הַנַּח לְפָנַי״ – שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם. אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: אָמַר לוֹ הַנַּח לְפָנֶיךָ – אֵינוֹ לֹא שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם וְלֹא שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר. אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: הַנַּח סְתָמָא, מַאי? תָּא שְׁמַע: שְׁמוֹר לִי וְאָמַר לוֹ הַנַּח לְפָנַי – שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם. הָא סְתָמָא – וְלֹא כְּלוּם.

§ The mishna teaches that if one says to another: Safeguard my property for me, and the other says to him: Place it before me, the second individual is an unpaid bailee. Rav Huna said: If the second individual said to him: Place it down before yourself, he is neither an unpaid bailee nor a paid bailee, and he has no responsibility at all. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If he said simply: Place it down, without specifying further, what is the halakha? The Gemara attempts to provide an answer from the mishna. Come and hear: If one says to another: Safeguard my property for me, and the other says to him: Place it before me, the second individual is an unpaid bailee. This indicates that an unspecified statement is nothing.

אַדְּרַבָּה, מִדְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא: ״הַנַּח לְפָנֶיךָ״ – הוּא דְּאֵינוֹ לֹא שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם וְלֹא שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר, הָא סְתָמָא שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם הָוֵי! אֶלָּא מֵהָא לֵיכָּא לְמִשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

The Gemara rejects this inference: On the contrary, one can infer the opposite from that which Rav Huna says: If the second individual said to him: Place it down in front of yourself, it is in this case that he is neither an unpaid bailee nor a paid bailee. This indicates that if he said simply: Place it down, without specifying further, he is an unpaid bailee. Rather, no inference is to be learned from this mishna, as the inferences are contradictory concerning this halakha.

לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי: אִם הִכְנִיס בִּרְשׁוּת בַּעַל חָצֵר – חַיָּיב. רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: בְּכוּלָּם אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁיְּקַבֵּל עָלָיו בַּעַל הַבַּיִת לִשְׁמוֹר.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this matter is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im, as it was taught in a mishna (Bava Kamma 47b): If one brought his items into the courtyard of another with the permission of the owner of the courtyard and they were damaged there, the owner of the courtyard is liable. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: In all cases he is liable only if the owner of the courtyard explicitly accepts upon himself to safeguard the items. That mishna is apparently referring to one who places his items in a yard without specification, and the tanna’im disagreed on the question of liability; it therefore has a parallel application to the case in this mishna.

מִמַּאי? דִּלְמָא עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן הָתָם אֶלָּא בְּחָצֵר דְּבַת נַטּוֹרֵי הִיא, וְכִי קָאָמַר לֵיהּ ״עַיֵּיל״ – ״עַיֵּיל דְּאִינְטַר לָךְ״ קָאָמַר לֵיהּ. אֲבָל הָכָא, שׁוּקָא לָאו בַּר נַטּוֹרֵי הוּא, ״אַנַּח וְתִיב נְטַר לָךְ״ קָאָמַר לֵיהּ.

The Gemara refutes this claim. From where do you know that these cases are parallel? Perhaps the Rabbis there say their opinion only in a courtyard, which can be safeguarded, and therefore when the owner of the courtyard allowed the other to bring his items into the courtyard and said to him: Place them in, what he was saying to him was: Place them in so that I can safeguard it for you. But here, in a market, which is a place where goods cannot be safeguarded, he was actually saying to him: Place it down and sit and safeguard it yourself.

אִי נָמֵי: עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי הָתָם אֶלָּא בַּחֲצֵירוֹ, דִּלְעַיּוֹלֵי רְשׁוּתָא קָא בָעֵי לְמִשְׁקַל מִינֵּיהּ וְכִי יָהֵיב לֵיהּ רְשׁוּתָא לְעַיּוֹלֵי – ״תִּיב וְנַטַּר לָךְ״ קָאָמַר לֵיהּ. אֲבָל הָכָא – ״הַנַּח וַאֲנָא מְנַטַּרְנָא״ קָאָמַר לֵיהּ. דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ ״הַנַּח וְתִיב וְנַטַּר״ קָאָמַר לֵיהּ, אִי לְאוֹתֹבֵה, רְשׁוּתָא בָּעֵי לְמִשְׁקַל מִינֵּיהּ?

Alternatively, one can say the opposite: Perhaps Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says his ruling, that the owner of the courtyard is not liable, only there, in his courtyard, as he requires permission from the owner of the courtyard to enter, and when the owner of the courtyard gave him permission to enter, all he said to him was: Sit and safeguard it. But here, in the market, when he said to the owner of the item: Place it down, he was saying to him: Place it down and I will safeguard it for you. As if it enters your mind that he was saying to him: Place it down and sit and safeguard it yourself, does the owner of the item really require permission from him to put an item down in a public place? In light of these suggestions, there is not necessarily a connection between the two mishnayot.

הִלְוָהוּ עַל הַמַּשְׁכּוֹן – שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר. לֵימָא מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר? דְּתַנְיָא: הַמַּלְוֶה אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ עַל הַמַּשְׁכּוֹן וְאָבַד הַמַּשְׁכּוֹן – יִשָּׁבַע וְיִטּוֹל מְעוֹתָיו, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר.

§ The mishna teaches: One who lent to another based on collateral is a paid bailee for the collateral. The Gemara comments: Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who lends to another based on collateral and the collateral was lost, the lender takes an oath that he was not negligent in his safeguarding, and then he may take his money that he lent him. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer, who apparently maintains that the lender took the collateral as proof of the loan, and therefore he is considered an unpaid bailee, who is liable for negligence unless he takes an oath.

רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: יָכוֹל לוֹמַר לוֹ: כְּלוּם הִלְוִיתַנִי אֶלָּא עַל הַמַּשְׁכּוֹן? אָבַד הַמַּשְׁכּוֹן – אָבְדוּ מְעוֹתֶיךָ. אֲבָל הִלְוָהוּ אֶלֶף זוּז בִּשְׁטָר וְהִנִּיחַ לוֹ מַשְׁכּוֹן עֲלֵיהֶם, דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל: אָבַד הַמַּשְׁכּוֹן – אָבְדוּ מְעוֹתָיו.

The baraita continues: Rabbi Akiva says that the borrower can say to him: Didn’t you lend to me only based on the collateral? If the collateral is lost, your money is lost. In other words, the collateral was taken as security for the debt. But if he lent him one thousand dinars by means of a promissory note and the borrower left him collateral against the money, everyone agrees that if the collateral is lost, his money is lost. In this case it cannot be claimed that the collateral was held as proof of the debt, as there is a document attesting to the debt. Consequently, it was evidently taken as security corresponding to the loan, which means that if the collateral is lost, the lender loses his money.

אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, וְלָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן – שֶׁמִּשְׁכְּנוֹ בִּשְׁעַת הַלְוָאָתוֹ, כָּאן – שֶׁמִּשְׁכְּנוֹ שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁעַת הַלְוָאָתוֹ.

The Gemara refutes this suggestion: Even if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, it is not difficult. Here, the baraita is referring to a case where the lender took his collateral at the time of his loan, and therefore the collateral served as proof of the loan, whereas there, the mishna is referring to a case where the lender took his collateral later, not at the time of his loan, to enhance his ability to collect payment. In this latter case, the collateral is clearly security for the money, and therefore he is considered a paid bailee.

וְהָא אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי,

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But don’t both this and that, the mishna and the baraita,