דִּכְתִיבָא בְּהֶדְיָא – קָתָנֵי, דְּאָתְיָא מִדְּרָשָׁא – לָא קָתָנֵי.

that is explicitly written in the Torah he teaches, and those matters that are derived through interpretation he does not teach. Consequently, no proof can be brought from the mishna.

תָּא שְׁמַע: שְׁאָלָהּ וְשָׁאַל בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, שְׂכָרָהּ וְשָׂכַר בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, שְׁאָלָהּ וְשָׂכַר בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, שְׂכָרָהּ וְשָׁאַל בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהַבְּעָלִים עוֹשִׂין מְלָאכָה בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר, וָמֵתָה – פָּטוּר.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: If one borrowed an animal and borrowed the services of its owner with it, or rented it and hired its owner with it, or borrowed it and hired its owner with it, or rented it and borrowed the services of its owner with it; in all of these cases, although the owner performed the work for him in another place, i.e., not near the animal, and it dies, the borrower or renter is exempt.

סַבְרוּהָ הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, דְּאָמַר: שׂוֹכֵר כְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר דָּמֵי! וְהָא הַאי תַּנָּא קָתָנֵי מִילְּתָא דְּאָתְיָא מִדְּרָשָׁא, וְאִילּוּ שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם לָא קָתָנֵי!

The Gemara notes: The scholars in the study hall assumed that this baraita is in accordance with whose opinion? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that one who rents an item is responsible for it like a paid bailee. According to his understanding, the baraita teaches that the exemption from liability applies to both a borrower and a paid bailee. Consequently, the baraita can serve as a proof: Doesn’t this tanna teach even a matter that is derived through interpretation, i.e., the fact that exemption from liability applies to a paid bailee, while he still does not teach that it applies to an unpaid bailee? It would appear that this is a proof that exemption from liability does not apply to an unpaid bailee, since it does not apply to a mishap that is the result of the bailee’s negligence.

הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: שׂוֹכֵר כְּשׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם דָּמֵי, וְתַנָּא שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם, וְהוּא הַדִּין לְשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר.

The Gemara refutes this proof, as one could counter: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that the liability of one who rents an item is like that of an unpaid bailee. And, according to his understanding, the baraita teaches that the exemption from liability applies to an unpaid bailee, and it is understood that the same is true for a paid bailee. Understood like this, the baraita explicitly applies the exemption from liability to a case of negligence. Since, ultimately, it is unclear according to whose opinion the baraita is taught, no proof can be drawn from it.

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא כִּדְמַחְלֵיף רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ וְתָנֵי: שׂוֹכֵר כֵּיצַד מְשַׁלֵּם? רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: כְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: כְּשׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם.

If you wish, say that the baraita can be understood as referring to an unpaid bailee, even if it is assumed to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. As Rabba bar Avuh reversed their opinions and taught: How does one who rents an item pay in the case of a mishap? Rabbi Meir says: Like a paid bailee. Rabbi Yehuda says: Like an unpaid bailee.

אָמַר רַב הַמְנוּנָא: לְעוֹלָם הוּא חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא פָּרָה וְחוֹרֵשׁ בָּהּ, חֲמוֹר וּמְחַמֵּר אַחֲרֶיהָ, וְעַד שֶׁיְּהוּ בְּעָלִים מִשְּׁעַת שְׁאֵילָה עַד שְׁעַת שְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה. אַלְמָא קָסָבַר ״בְּעָלָיו עִמּוֹ״ – אַכּוּלַּהּ מִילְּתָא מַשְׁמַע.

§ Rav Hamnuna says that the exemption from liability when one borrows an item together with the services of its owner exists only in very specific circumstances: A borrower is always liable, unless the item entrusted to him is a cow and its owner plows with it in the service of the borrower, or it is a donkey and its owner drives it by walking behind it in the service of the borrower, i.e., the owner and his animal are engaged in the same work. And even so, the borrower will not be exempt unless the owner is working for him from the time of the borrowing of the animal until the time when it is injured or dies. The Gemara notes: Evidently, Rav Hamnuna holds that the phrase: “Its owner is with him” (Exodus 22:14), teaches that the exemption from liability applies only when the owner is working for the borrower for the entire matter.

מֵתִיב רָבָא: שְׁאָלָהּ וְשָׁאַל בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, שְׂכָרָהּ וְשָׂכַר בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, שְׂכָרָהּ וְשָׁאַל בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, שְׁאָלָהּ וְשָׂכַר בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהַבְּעָלִים עוֹשִׂין מְלָאכָה בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר וָמֵתָה – פָּטוּר. מַאי לָאו ״בִּמְלָאכָה אַחֶרֶת״?

Rava raises an objection from the baraita cited previously: If one borrowed an animal and borrowed the services of its owner with it, or rented it and hired its owner with it, or rented it and borrowed the services of its owner with it, or borrowed it and hired its owner with it; in all these cases, although the owner performed the work for him in another place, i.e., not near the animal, and it died, the borrower or renter is exempt. Rava explains how the baraita poses a challenge: What, is it not referring to a case where the owner was engaged with different work than his animal? The baraita proves that the exemption from liability applies even in such a case.

לָא, בְּאוֹתָהּ מְלָאכָה. אֶלָּא, מַאי ״מָקוֹם אַחֵר״? דְּקָא מְרַפֵּי וְאָזֵיל קַמַּהּ.

The Gemara rejects this: No, the baraita is referring to a case where the owner was engaged with the same work as the animal. The Gemara asks: But, if so, what does the baraita mean by saying: He performed the work in another place? The Gemara explains: For example, it is a case where the owner loosens the hard soil with a hoe while walking ahead of the animal. He is engaged in the same work, but not in the same place.

וְהָא מִדְּסֵיפָא ״עַל גַּבָּהּ״ הָוֵי, רֵישָׁא בִּמְלָאכָה אַחֶרֶת, דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: שְׁאָלָהּ וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁאַל בְּעָלֶיהָ, שְׂכָרָהּ וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׂכַר בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהַבְּעָלִים חוֹרְשִׁין עַל גַּבָּהּ וָמֵתָה – חַיָּיב!

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But from the fact that the latter clause of the baraita is referring to a case where the owner was working alongside it, it may be inferred that the first clause, i.e., the passage of the baraita cited above, is referring to a case where the owner was engaged with different work. As the latter clause teaches: If he borrowed it and afterward borrowed the services of its owner, or rented it and afterward hired its owner with it, in both these cases, although the owner was plowing alongside it and at that time it died, the borrower or renter is liable.

אָמְרִי: רֵישָׁא וְסֵיפָא בְּאוֹתָהּ מְלָאכָה, וְרֵישָׁא רְבוּתָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, וְסֵיפָא רְבוּתָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. רֵישָׁא רְבוּתָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּלָאו עַל גַּבָּהּ אֶלָּא בְּאוֹתָהּ מְלָאכָה, כֵּיוָן דַּהֲווֹ בְּעָלִים בִּשְׁעַת שְׁאֵילָה – פָּטוּר. וְסֵיפָא רְבוּתָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּעַל גַּבָּהּ, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא הֲווֹ בְּעָלִים בִּשְׁעַת שְׁאֵילָה – חַיָּיב.

In resolution of this difficulty, the Sages say: Both the first clause and the latter clause pertain to a case where the owner was engaged with the same work as the animal. And the difference in formulation of the two clauses is because the first clause teaches us a novelty and the latter clause teaches us a novelty. The first clause teaches us the novelty that although the owner was not actually working alongside his animal but was merely engaged with the same work, since the owner was working for the borrower at the time of the borrowing, the borrower is exempt. The latter clause teaches us the novelty that although the owner was actually working alongside his animal, since the owner was not working for the borrower at the time of the borrowing, the borrower is liable.

הַאי מַאי?! אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא רֵישָׁא בִּמְלָאכָה אַחֶרֶת, וְסֵיפָא בְּאוֹתָהּ מְלָאכָה – הַיְינוּ רְבוּתָא.

The Gemara is puzzled: What is this? Granted, if you say that the first clause is referring to a case where the owner is engaged in different work than his animal, and the latter clause is referring to a case where he is engaged in the same work as his animal, then this is the novelty of mentioning what type of work he did: It teaches that it is irrelevant whether the owner did or did not work together with his animal. Rather, the liability of the borrower depends on whether or not the owner was working for the borrower when he entrusted the borrower with his animal.

אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ רֵישָׁא וְסֵיפָא בְּאוֹתָהּ מְלָאכָה, מַאי רְבוּתָא? אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי בְּאוֹתָהּ מְלָאכָה הָוֵי!

But if you say that the first clause and the latter clause both pertain to a case where the owner is engaged in the same work as his animal, what is the novelty of mentioning what type of work he did? Both this clause and that clause concern similar cases, in which the owner is engaged in the same work as his animal. It is therefore apparent that the clauses concern different cases. The first clause teaches that the borrower is exempt even in a case where the owner was engaged in different work than his animal. The first part of Rav Hamnuna’s ruling, that the owner needs to be engaged in the same work as his animal, is thereby refuted.

וְעוֹד, תַּנְיָא: מִמַּשְׁמַע שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״אִם בְּעָלָיו עִמּוֹ לֹא יְשַׁלֵּם״ אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁאִם בְּעָלָיו אֵין עִמּוֹ שַׁלֵּם יְשַׁלֵּם? אֶלָּא מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״בְּעָלָיו אֵין עִמּוֹ״ – לוֹמַר לָךְ: הָיָה עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁעַת שְׁאֵילָה – אֵין צָרִיךְ לִהְיוֹת עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁעַת שְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה, הָיָה עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁעַת שְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה – צָרִיךְ לִהְיוֹת עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁעַת שְׁאֵילָה.

And furthermore, even the second part of Rav Hamnuna’s ruling, that the exemption applies only when the owner was working for the borrower from the time of the borrowing of the animal until the time of the mishap, can be refuted, as it is taught in a baraita: From the implication of that which is stated: “If its owner is with him, he does not pay” (Exodus 22:14), do I not already know what is stated in the next verse, that “if its owner is not with him, he shall pay” (Exodus 22:13)? Rather, what is the meaning when the verse states: “Its owner is not with him”? It serves to tell you: If he was with him, i.e., working for him, at the time of borrowing, he does not need to be with him at the time when the animal is injured or dies for the exemption from liability to apply; but if he was with him at the time when the animal is injured or dies, he does need to have been with him at the time of borrowing for the exemption from liability to apply.

וְתַנְיָא אִידַּךְ: מִמַּשְׁמַע שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״בְּעָלָיו אֵין עִמּוֹ שַׁלֵּם יְשַׁלֵּם״ אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁאִם בְּעָלָיו עִמּוֹ לֹא יְשַׁלֵּם? אֶלָּא מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״אִם בְּעָלָיו עִמּוֹ״? לוֹמַר לְךָ: כֵּיוָן שֶׁיָּצְאָה מֵרְשׁוּת מַשְׁאִיל שָׁעָה אַחַת בִּבְעָלִים וָמֵתָה – פָּטוּר. תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרַב הַמְנוּנָא. תְּיוּבְתָּא.

And it is taught in another baraita: From the implication of that which is stated: “If its owner is not with him, he shall pay,” do I not already know what is stated in the preceding verse, that “if its owner is with him, he does not pay”? Rather, what is the meaning when the verse states: “If its owner is with him”? It serves to tell you: Once the animal has left the domain of the lender, i.e., its owner, and has been entrusted to the borrower, with its owner working for the borrower at that time, even for only one moment, and then it dies, the borrower is exempt. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rav Hamnuna provided by these baraitot is indeed a conclusive refutation.

אַבָּיֵי סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה, וּמְתָרֵץ לִקְרָאֵי כְּרַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה. רָבָא סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יוֹנָתָן, וּמְתָרֵץ לִקְרָאֵי כְּרַבִּי יוֹנָתָן.

§ The Gemara explains how the first of these baraitot arrives at its conclusion: Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, that when the Torah mentions two details together in reference to a halakha, it is presumed that the halakha applies only when both details are in effect (see 94b), and he likewise explains the two verses in accordance with Rabbi Yoshiya. Rava holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan, that it is presumed that the halakha applies even when only one of the details is in effect, and he explains the verses in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan.

אַבָּיֵי סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה וּמְתָרֵץ לִקְרָאֵי כְּרַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה: ״בְּעָלָיו אֵין עִמּוֹ שַׁלֵּם יְשַׁלֵּם״, טַעְמָא דְּלֵיתֵיהּ בְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ, הָא אִיתֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא וְלֵיתֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא – פָּטוּר.

The Gemara clarifies: When the Torah refers to an owner working for the borrower, it should be understood as referring to the time of the borrowing and the time of the mishap. According to Rabbi Yoshiya’s opinion, this indicates that the owner worked for him at both times, whereas according to Rabbi Yonatan’s opinion, this implies that he worked for him at either time. Based on this, Abaye and Rava explain the verses: Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, and he likewise explains the two verses in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, thereby arriving at the conclusion of the baraita, as follows: From the verse: “If its owner is not with him, he shall pay,” it appears that the reason the borrower is liable is that the owner was not working for him at either point in time. By inference, if he worked for him at one of those times but not at the other one, the borrower is exempt.

וְהָא כְּתִיב: ״אִם בְּעָלָיו עִמּוֹ לֹא יְשַׁלֵּם״, טַעְמָא דְּאִיתֵיהּ בְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ, הָא אִי אִיתֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא וְלֵיתֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא – מִחַיַּיב.

The Gemara raises an objection: But isn’t it written: “If its owner is with him, he does not pay”? From this verse it appears that the reason the borrower is exempt is that the owner was working for him at both points in time. By inference, if he was working for him at one of those times but not at the other one, the borrower is liable. The two verses appear to contradict each another.

לוֹמַר לָךְ: הָיָה עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁעַת שְׁאֵילָה – אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לִהְיוֹת עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁעַת שְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה, הָיָה עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁעַת שְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה – צָרִיךְ לִהְיוֹת עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁעַת שְׁאֵילָה.

To reconcile the verses, one must say that the phrase “if its owner is with him” serves to tell you: If he was with him, i.e., working for him, at the time of borrowing, he does not need to be with him at the time when the animal is injured or dies for the exemption from liability to apply; but if he was with him at the time when the animal is injured or dies, he does need to have been with him at the time of borrowing for the exemption to apply.