כָּךְ וְכָךְ גַּבְרֵי אִיכָּא בַּהֲדַן, כָּךְ וְכָךְ כַּלְבֵי אִיכָּא בַּהֲדַן, כָּךְ וְכָךְ זוּקָתָא פְּסִיקָא לַן. וַאֲזַל וּשְׁקַל מִינֵּיהּ, מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הֲרֵי הוֹלִיכָן לִמְקוֹם גְּדוּדֵי חַיָּה וְלִסְטִים.

we have such and such men with us; such and such dogs with us, and such and such slings [zukata] with us. In other words, we are fully protected and you should not dare to take anything from us. If the thief subsequently went and took an animal from him, what is the halakha? Rava said to Abaye: It is as though he has taken them to a place of groups of beasts and bandits, as his taunting of the thief motivated the theft.

מַתְנִי׳ מַתְנֶה שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם לִהְיוֹת פָּטוּר מִשְּׁבוּעָה, וְהַשּׁוֹאֵל לִהְיוֹת פָּטוּר מִלְּשַׁלֵּם, נוֹשֵׂא שָׂכָר וְהַשּׂוֹכֵר לִהְיוֹת פְּטוּרִין מִשְּׁבוּעָה וּמִלְּשַׁלֵּם. כׇּל הַמַּתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה – תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל,

MISHNA: The halakhot of bailees stated in the previous mishna apply to standard cases. The halakha is that in any case involving monetary matters the parties may agree to special terms. Therefore, an unpaid bailee may stipulate with the owner that he will be exempt from taking an oath if the item is lost, and similarly, a borrower may stipulate that he will be exempt from having to pay, and a paid bailee or a renter can stipulate that he will be exempt from taking an oath and from having to pay, as one can relinquish his monetary rights. With regard to matters that do not involve monetary claims, anyone who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his stipulation is void.

וְכׇל תְּנַאי שֶׁיֵּשׁ מַעֲשֶׂה בִּתְחִילָּתוֹ – תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל. וְכׇל שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְקַיְּימוֹ בְּסוֹפוֹ, וְהִתְנָה עִמּוֹ מִתְּחִילָּתוֹ – תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים.

And any condition that is preceded by an action, i.e., the agreement is formulated with the promise of an action followed by a statement that this action will be carried out only under certain terms, the condition is void and the promise remains intact. The condition must be stated before the action. And with regard to any condition that one can ultimately fulfill, but he stipulated with him initially, i.e., in practice the action is performed first, followed by the fulfillment of the condition, nevertheless, because it was formulated in the proper manner, with the condition first, his condition is valid. If the condition cannot be fulfilled at all, once the action has been carried out the condition is void.

גְּמָ׳ אַמַּאי? מַתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה הוּא, וְכׇל הַמַּתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל!

GEMARA: The Gemara asks a question with regard to the mishna’s statement that bailees can issue conditions and change the liabilities imposed on them by Torah law: Why are they able to do so? This is a case of one who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, as the Torah determines who takes an oath and who must pay, and with regard to anyone who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void.

הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, דְּאָמַר: בְּדָבָר שֶׁבְּמָמוֹן – תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים. דְּתַנְיָא: הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין לִיךְ עָלַי שְׁאֵר כְּסוּת וְעוֹנָה״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וּתְנָאוֹ בָּטֵל, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּדָבָר שֶׁבְּמָמוֹן – תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים.

The Gemara explains: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is that of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that if the condition that runs counter to that which is written in the Torah is referring to monetary matters, his condition is valid. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that you have no claim against me to give you food, clothing, and conjugal rights, she is betrothed but his condition is void; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi Yehuda said: With regard to monetary matters, i.e., her food and clothing, his condition is valid.

וּמִי מָצֵית מוֹקְמַתְּ לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? אֵימָא סֵיפָא: כׇּל הַמַּתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה – תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל, אֲתָאן לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר! הָא לָא קַשְׁיָא: לְעוֹלָם רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, וְסֵיפָא – בְּדָבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁל מָמוֹן.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But can you establish the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? Say the latter clause of the mishna: Anyone who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void. In this clause we arrive at the opinion of Rabbi Meir. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as actually you can explain that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and the latter clause is referring to non-monetary matters.

אֵימָא סֵיפָא: כׇּל תְּנַאי שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה בִּתְחִילָּתוֹ – תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל, מַאן שָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ דְּאִית לֵיהּ הָא סְבָרָא – רַבִּי מֵאִיר, דְּתַנְיָא: אַבָּא חֲלַפְתָּא אִישׁ כְּפַר חֲנַנְיָא אָמַר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי מֵאִיר: תְּנַאי קוֹדֵם לַמַּעֲשֶׂה – הֲרֵי זֶה תְּנַאי, מַעֲשֶׂה קוֹדֵם לַתְּנַאי – אֵינוֹ תְּנַאי.

The Gemara continues to question this explanation: But say the latter clause from near the end of the mishna: And any condition that is preceded by an action, the condition is void. Who have you heard who accepts this reasoning? It is Rabbi Meir, as it is taught in a baraita: Abba Ḥalafta, from the village of Ḥananya, said in the name of Rabbi Meir: If a condition was stated before the action, this is a valid condition, but if the action came before the condition, it is not a valid condition.

אֶלָּא כּוּלַּהּ רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, וְשָׁאנֵי הָכָא, דְּמֵעִיקָּרָא לָא שַׁעְבֵּד נַפְשֵׁיהּ.

Rather, the Gemara retracts the previous explanation and states that the entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Why, then, is the bailee exempt from payment or an oath? Because here it is different, as at the outset he did not obligate himself in the halakhot of a bailee as stated in the Torah. Before he entered into the agreement, he clearly stated that he is unwilling to accept upon himself the liabilities of a paid or an unpaid bailee by Torah law.

תָּנָא: וּמַתְנֶה שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר לִהְיוֹת כְּשׁוֹאֵל. בְּמַאי? בִּדְבָרִים?! אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: בְּשֶׁקָּנוּ מִיָּדוֹ.

A Sage taught in a baraita: Just as a bailee can issue a condition that he should be exempt, the converse is also possible: A paid bailee can stipulate to be like a borrower, i.e., he can accept upon himself all the responsibilities of a borrower. The Gemara asks: By what means is this commitment binding? Is it merely by speech alone? Mere speech is not sufficient to demonstrate a commitment of this kind. Shmuel said: No; it is referring to a case where the owner performed an act of acquisition with the bailee affirming this arrangement. The obligation goes into effect only if there was an act of acquisition.

וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא בְּשֶׁלֹּא קָנוּ מִיָּדוֹ, בְּהָהִיא הֲנָאָה דְּקָא נָפֵיק לֵיהּ קָלָא דְּאִינִישׁ מְהֵימְנָא הוּא – גָּמַיר וּמְשַׁעְבֵּד נַפְשֵׁיהּ.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: You may even say that it is referring to a situation where the owner did not perform an act of acquisition with the bailee, and even so he is liable as a borrower. The reason is that by means of that benefit he receives from the fact that a rumor goes out about him that he is a trustworthy person, he commits wholeheartedly to obligate himself, even by means of a verbal promise alone. Therefore, there is no need for a formal act of acquisition.

וְכׇל שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְקַיְּימוֹ בְּסוֹפוֹ וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רַב טַבְלָא אָמַר רַב: זוֹ דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן תֵּימָא. אֲבָל חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְקַיְּימוֹ בְּסוֹפוֹ וְהִתְנָה עָלָיו מִתְּחִילָּתוֹ – תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים.

§ The mishna teaches: With regard to any condition that ultimately can be fulfilled, if he stipulated it initially, his condition is valid. Rav Tavla says that Rav says: This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima, but the Rabbis say: Even though one cannot ultimately fulfill the condition, and he stipulated with regard to it initially, his condition is valid.

דְּתַנְיָא: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטִּךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁתַּעֲלִי לָרָקִיעַ, עַל מְנָת שֶׁתֵּרְדִי לַתְּהוֹם, עַל מְנָת שֶׁתִּבְלְעִי קָנֶה שֶׁל מֵאָה אַמָּה, עַל מְנָת שֶׁתַּעַבְרִי אֶת הַיָּם הַגָּדוֹל בְּרַגְלַיִךְ״, נִתְקַיֵּים הַתְּנַאי – הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט, לֹא נִתְקַיֵּים הַתְּנַאי – אֵינוֹ גֵּט.

As it is taught in a baraita: If a man said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you ascend to the skies, or on the condition that you descend to the depths; or on the condition that you swallow a reed of one hundred cubits in size; or on the condition that you cross the Great Sea by foot, only if the condition was fulfilled and she did as he demanded is this a valid bill of divorce, but if the condition was not fulfilled it is not a valid bill of divorce. According to this tanna, the condition is binding despite the fact that it cannot be fulfilled in practice.

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן תֵּימָא אוֹמֵר: כָּזֶה – גֵּט. כְּלָל אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן תֵּימָא: כֹּל שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְקַיְּימוֹ בְּסוֹפוֹ, וְהִתְנָה עָלָיו מִתְּחִילָּתוֹ – אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא כְּמַפְלִיגָהּ וְכָשֵׁר.

Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima says: A document such as this is a valid bill of divorce. The condition is negated, and therefore the bill of divorce is valid even though the condition was not fulfilled. As Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima stated a principle: With regard to any condition that one cannot ultimately fulfill, i.e., a condition that cannot be fulfilled at all, and yet he stipulated to this effect, even if he did so initially, he is considered as only exaggerating, and the document is valid. The supposed condition is not taken seriously and is not binding.

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן תֵּימָא. אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: מַתְנִיתִין נָמֵי דַּיְקָא, דְּקָתָנֵי: כׇּל שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְקַיְּימוֹ בְּסוֹפוֹ וְהִתְנָה עָלָיו מִתְּחִילָּתוֹ – תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים, הָא אִי אֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְקַיְּימוֹ – תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

Rav Naḥman says that Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The mishna is also precisely formulated in accordance with this opinion, as it teaches: With regard to any condition that ultimately he can fulfill, and he stipulated with regard to it initially, his condition is valid. This indicates that if he cannot fulfill it, his condition is void. The Gemara affirms: One can learn from this formulation that the unattributed mishna does in fact represent the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הַשּׂוֹכֵר אֶת הַפּוֹעֲלִים.

MISHNA: In the case of one who borrowed a cow and borrowed the services of its owner with it, or he borrowed a cow and hired its owner with it, or he borrowed the services of the owner or hired him and afterward borrowed the cow; in all such cases, if the cow died, the borrower is exempt from liability. Although a borrower is generally liable to pay if a cow he borrowed dies, here he is exempt, as it is stated: “If its owner is with him, he does not pay” (Exodus 22:14).

מַתְנִי׳ הַשּׁוֹאֵל אֶת הַפָּרָה וְשָׁאַל בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, אוֹ שָׂכַר בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, שָׁאַל הַבְּעָלִים אוֹ שְׂכָרָן וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁאַל אֶת הַפָּרָה וָמֵתָה – פָּטוּר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אִם בְּעָלָיו עִמּוֹ לֹא יְשַׁלֵּם״.