״וְחֵי אָחִיךָ עִמָּךְ״. אַהְדַּר לֵיהּ כִּי הֵיכִי דְּנֵיחֵי.

“And your brother shall live with you” (Leviticus 25:36), from which it is derived: Return the interest to him so that he may live.

וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, הַאי ״וְחֵי אָחִיךָ עִמָּךְ״ מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: שְׁנַיִם שֶׁהָיוּ מְהַלְּכִין בַּדֶּרֶךְ וּבְיַד אֶחָד מֵהֶן קִיתוֹן שֶׁל מַיִם, אִם שׁוֹתִין שְׁנֵיהֶם – מֵתִים. וְאִם שׁוֹתֶה אֶחָד מֵהֶן – מַגִּיעַ לַיִּשּׁוּב. דָּרַשׁ בֶּן פְּטוֹרָא: מוּטָב שֶׁיִּשְׁתּוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם וְיָמוּתוּ, וְאַל יִרְאֶה אֶחָד מֵהֶם בְּמִיתָתוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ. עַד שֶׁבָּא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וְלִימֵּד: ״וְחֵי אָחִיךָ עִמָּךְ״, חַיֶּיךָ קוֹדְמִים לְחַיֵּי חֲבֵירֶךָ.

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yoḥanan, what does he do with this verse: “And your brother shall live with you”? The Gemara answers: He requires the verse for that which is taught in a baraita: If two people were walking on a desolate path and there was a jug [kiton] of water in the possession of one of them, and the situation was such that if both drink from the jug, both will die, as there is not enough water, but if only one of them drinks, he will reach a settled area, there is a dispute as to the halakha. Ben Petora taught: It is preferable that both of them drink and die, and let neither one of them see the death of the other. This was the accepted opinion until Rabbi Akiva came and taught that the verse states: “And your brother shall live with you,” indicating that your life takes precedence over the life of the other.

מֵיתִיבִי: הִנִּיחַ לָהֶם אֲבִיהֶם מָעוֹת שֶׁל רִבִּית, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיּוֹדְעִים שֶׁהֵן שֶׁל רִבִּית – אֵינָן חַיָּיבִין לְהַחְזִירָן. הָא אֲבִיהֶן חַיָּיב לְהַחְזִיר!

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita to the opinion that one is not obligated to return interest that he took: If their father bequeathed them money that he had collected as interest, even though his sons know that the money was collected as interest, they are not obligated to return the money. The Gemara infers: But this indicates that their father himself is obligated to return the money.

בְּדִין הוּא דַּאֲבוּהוֹן נָמֵי לָא מִיחַיַּיב לְהַחְזִיר, וְאַיְּידֵי דְּקָא בָעֵי לְמִתְנֵי סֵיפָא: הִנִּיחַ לָהֶן אֲבִיהֶם פָּרָה וְטַלִּית וְכׇל דָּבָר הַמְסוּיָּם חַיָּיבִין לְהַחְזִיר מִפְּנֵי כְּבוֹד אֲבִיהֶם, תָּנֵי נָמֵי רֵישָׁא בְּדִידְהוּ.

The Gemara rejects the inference: By right, it should have said that their father is also not obligated to return the money. But since the tanna wants to teach the latter clause, which states: If their father bequeathed them a cow, or a garment, or any defined item that was stolen property, they are obligated to return it to its owner due to their obligation to uphold their father’s honor, the tanna also taught the first clause with regard to their obligation, not that of their father.

וְהָנֵי, מִפְּנֵי כְּבוֹד אֲבִיהֶם מִי מִיחַיְּיבִי? קְרִי כָּאן: ״וְנָשִׂיא בְעַמְּךָ לֹא תָאֹר״, בְּעוֹשֶׂה מַעֲשֵׂה עַמְּךָ.

The Gemara asks: And these children, are they obligated to take action due to the obligation to uphold their father’s honor? Read and apply here the verse: “Nor curse a ruler of your people” (Exodus 22:27), from which it is inferred that this prohibition applies only to one who performs an action becoming of your people. The actions of the father, who lent money with interest, were unbecoming of the Jewish people. Why then, must his sons uphold his honor?

כִּדְאָמַר רַבִּי פִּנְחָס מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: בְּשֶׁעָשָׂה תְּשׁוּבָה, הָכָא נָמֵי בְּשֶׁעָשָׂה תְּשׁוּבָה. אִי עָשָׂה תְּשׁוּבָה, מַאי בָּעֵי גַּבֵּיהּ? שֶׁלֹּא הִסְפִּיק לְהַחְזִיר עַד שֶׁמֵּת.

The Gemara explains: It is as Rabbi Pineḥas said in the name of Rava in a different context, that it is referring to a case where the father repented. Here too, it is a case where the father repented, and therefore he was righteous and worthy of respect. The Gemara asks: If he repented, what is the stolen item doing in his possession? The Gemara answers: It is a case where the father did not manage to return the item before he died. Consequently, the children must return the item in order to uphold their father’s honor.

מֵיתִיבִי: הַגַּזְלָנִין וּמַלְוֵי רִבִּית, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁגָּבוּ – מַחְזִירִין. גַּזְלָנִים מַאי ״אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁגָּבוּ״ אִיכָּא? אִי גְּזוּל – גְּזוּל, אִי לָא גְּזוּל – גַּזְלָנִין קָרֵית לְהוּ?! אֶלָּא אֵימָא: גַּזְלָנִין, מַאי נִיהוּ? מַלְוֵי רִבִּית. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁגָּבוּ – מַחְזִירִין.

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: Concerning robbers and those who lend money with interest, even though they collected the money, they must return it. The Gemara analyzes the language of the baraita: In the case of robbers, what case is there that can be described as: Even though they collected the money? If they robbed, they robbed, and it is imprecise to use the language of collecting money; if they did not rob, do you call them robbers? Rather, say in explanation of the baraita: Robbers; in this context, who are they? They are those who lend with interest, and even though they collected the money, they must return it. Evidently, money collected as interest must be returned.

תַּנָּאֵי הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב פּוֹטְרִין אֶת הַמַּלְוֶה וְאֶת הֶעָרֵב, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן קוּם עֲשֵׂה. מַאי קוּם עֲשֵׂה? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן לְהוּ קוּמוּ אַהֲדוּרוּ?

The Gemara answers: In fact, this issue is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Neḥemya and Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov exempt the lender and the guarantor from lashes for violating the prohibition of interest, because although they violated a prohibition, once they have done so they are commanded to arise and take action, and there is a principle that one is not flogged for a transgression that can be rectified by the performance of a mitzva. The Gemara clarifies: What mitzva to arise and take action is there? Is it not due to the fact that we say to them: Arise and return it?

מִכְּלָל דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר לָאו בְּנֵי אַהְדּוֹרֵי נִינְהוּ! לָא, מַאי ״קוּם עֲשֵׂה״ – לִקְרוֹעַ שְׁטָרָא.

From the opinion of these Sages, it can be derived by inference that the first tanna holds that these people are not subject to the obligation of repayment. Apparently, he holds that there is no mitzva to arise and take action. The Gemara rejects that inference: No, what is the mitzva to arise and take action? It is the mitzva to tear up the promissory note documenting the commitment to pay interest.

מַאי קָסָבַר? אִי קָסָבַר שְׁטָר הָעוֹמֵד לִגְבּוֹת כְּגָבוּי דָּמֵי, וְהָא עֲבַדוּ אִיסּוּרַיְיהוּ. וְאִי לָאו כְּגָבוּי דָּמֵי, הָא לָא עֲבוּד וְלֹא כְּלוּם!

The Gemara asks: What is accomplished by tearing up the document? What does this tanna hold? If he holds that the legal status of the debt in a document that is fit to be collected is as though it were already collected, and accordingly, they already performed their transgression by writing the document, then they accomplish nothing by tearing it, as the very act of writing the document is tantamount to collecting the debt. And if the legal status of the debt in a document that is fit to be collected is not as though it were already collected, they have done nothing so long as the interest has not been collected. Either way, tearing up the document changes nothing.

לְעוֹלָם קָסָבַר שְׁטָר הָעוֹמֵד לִגְבּוֹת לָאו כְּגָבוּי דָּמֵי, וְהָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּשׂוּמָא מִילְּתָא הִיא.

The Gemara answers: Actually, this tanna holds that the legal status of the debt in a document that is fit to be collected is not as though it were already collected, and he teaches us the following principle: That appraisal of an item’s value is a significant matter. If a document was written for a loan with interest and the debtor’s property was appraised, this is itself a significant matter and punishable with lashes.

הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דִּתְנַן: וְאֵלּוּ עוֹבְרִים בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה: הַמַּלְוֶה וְהַלּוֹוֶה, הֶעָרֵב וְהָעֵדִים. בִּשְׁלָמָא כּוּלְּהוּ עֲבוּד מַעֲשֶׂה, אֶלָּא עֵדִים מַאי עֲבוּד? אֶלָּא לָאו, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ דְּשׂוּמָא מִילְּתָא הִיא. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

The Gemara comments: So too, it is reasonable to explain the matter in this way, as we learned in a mishna (75b): And these individuals violate the prohibition of interest: The lender, and the borrower, the guarantor, and the witnesses. The Gemara asks: Granted, with regard to all of them, i.e., the lender, the borrower, and the guarantor, it is understood that they violate the prohibition, as they performed an action. But with regard to the witnesses, what did they do to render themselves liable? Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from the mishna that the appraisal of an item’s value is a significant matter? Since the mishna states that the witnesses, whose testimony enables appraisal, participate in the transgression, this proves that appraisal is significant. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from the mishna that this is so.

אָמַר רַב סָפְרָא: כֹּל שֶׁאִילּוּ בְּדִינֵיהֶם מוֹצִיאִים מִלֹּוֶה לְמַלְוֶה, בְּדִינֵינוּ מַחְזִירִין מִמַּלְוֶה לְלֹוֶה. כֹּל שֶׁאִילּוּ בְּדִינֵיהֶם אֵין מוֹצִיאִין מִלֹּוֶה לְמַלְוֶה, בְּדִינֵינוּ אֵין מַחְזִירִין מִמַּלְוֶה לְלֹוֶה.

§ Rav Safra says: According to the opinion that the lender is compelled to return the money paid as interest, these are the rules to be employed: In any case where the obligation recorded in the document is so clear that by the laws of the gentiles, who are not prohibited from collecting interest, one removes the interest from the possession of the borrower to give to the lender, by our Jewish laws one returns the interest from the lender to the borrower. And in any case where the agreement is not unequivocal and by their laws one does not remove the interest from the possession of the borrower to give to the lender, by our laws one does not return the interest from the lender to the borrower.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרַב יוֹסֵף: וּכְלָלָא הוּא? וַהֲרֵי סְאָה בִּסְאָה – דִּבְדִינֵיהֶם מוֹצִיאִין מִלֹּוֶה לְמַלְוֶה, וּבְדִינֵינוּ אֵין מַחְזִירִין מִמַּלְוֶה לְלֹוֶה! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִינְהוּ בְּתוֹרַת פִּקָּדוֹן אֲתָא לִידֵיהּ.

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: And is it an established principle that applies in all cases? But there is the case where one lent a se’a of produce for the return of a se’a of the same type of produce, and the price of the produce went up in the interim, where by their laws one removes the interest from the possession of the borrower to give to the lender, and yet by our laws one does not return the interest from the lender to the borrower, as taking this type of interest is not prohibited by Torah law. Rav Yosef said to him: The gentiles do not consider that transaction a loan. Rather, according to their laws, it entered the possession of the borrower with the status of a deposit, and consequently, returning the produce is not considered repayment of a loan with interest, even though its value is greater than it was at the outset.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: וַהֲרֵי מַשְׁכַּנְתָּא בְּלָא נַכְיְיתָא – דִּבְדִינֵיהֶם מוֹצִיאִין מִלֹּוֶה לְמַלְוֶה

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: But there is the case of a mortgage without deduction, where the debtor’s field is held by the creditor until the debt is repaid, and while holding the field the creditor is allowed to consume the produce of the field without deducting from the debt the value of the produce he consumed. The consumption of the produce constitutes a type of interest, and in that case, by the laws of the gentiles one removes the interest from the possession of the borrower to give to the lender.