מִדִּבְרֵי שְׁנֵיהֶם נִלְמַד צַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא. וַאֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן לָא קָאָמַר, אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא מְסַיְּימִי קְרָאֵי. אֲבָל מְסַיְּימִי קְרָאֵי דָּרְשִׁינַן קַל וָחוֹמֶר, מִשּׁוּם מַאי? לָאו מִשּׁוּם צַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים דָּרְשִׁינַן?

From the statements of both of these tanna’im it can be learned that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law. As even Rabbi Shimon says that he disagreed with the opinion of the Rabbis only because the verses are not clearly defined; but had the verses been clearly defined, we would have learned the same a fortiori inference. Due to what factor can that inference be learned? What, is it not due to the matter of suffering of animals, which is a factor in unloading and not a factor in loading, that we would have learned the a fortiori inference?

דִּלְמָא מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא חֶסְרוֹן כִּיס. וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: וּמָה טְעִינָה דְּלֵית בַּהּ חֶסְרוֹן כִּיס – חַיָּיב, פְּרִיקָה דְּאִית בַּהּ חֶסְרוֹן כִּיס, לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?!

The Gemara rejects that proof. Perhaps the a fortiori inference is due to the fact that there is the factor of monetary loss in unloading but not in loading, and this is what the Rabbis are saying: If in the case of loading, where if one fails to assist the owner there is no potential monetary loss, one is obligated to help load the animal, in the case of unloading, where if one fails to assist the owner there is potential monetary loss, is it not all the more so clear that one is required to unload the burden?

וּטְעִינָה אֵין בָּהּ חֶסְרוֹן כִּיס? מִי לָא עָסְקִינַן דְּאַדְּהָכִי וְהָכִי בָּטֵיל מִשּׁוּקֵיהּ, אִי נָמֵי אָתוּ גַּנָּבֵי וְשָׁקְלִי כֹּל מָה דְּאִיכָּא בַּהֲדֵיהּ?

The Gemara asks: But is there no potential monetary loss in loading? Are we not also dealing with a case where in the meanwhile, while the owner waits for assistance, he will be prevented from bringing his merchandise to the marketplace in time to sell it; alternatively, thieves might come and take all the merchandise that is there with him? Therefore, no a fortiori inference can be learned on the basis of monetary loss, and the inference must be based on the matter of the suffering of animals.

תֵּדַע דְּצַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: אִם הָיָה עָלָיו יָתֵר [עַל] מַשָּׂאוֹ – אֵין זָקוּק לוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״תַּחַת מַשָּׂאוֹ״, מַשּׂאוֹי שֶׁיָּכוֹל לַעֲמוֹד בּוֹ. לָאו מִכְּלָל דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר זָקוּק לוֹ? מַאי טַעְמָא? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּצַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא?

The Gemara cites an additional proof: Know that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, as it is taught in the latter clause of the mishna: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: If there was a burden upon the animal greater than its typical burden, one need not attend to it, as it is stated: “Under its burden” (Exodus 23:5). Rabbi Yosei holds that the obligation to unload an animal is with regard to a burden that the animal can bear; does this not indicate by inference that the first tanna holds that he must attend to it to unload a burden that is greater than its typical burden? What is the reason for this ruling; is it not due to the fact that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law?

דִּלְמָא ״בְּתַחַת מַשָּׂאוֹ״ פְּלִיגִי, דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי סָבַר: דָּרְשִׁינַן ״תַּחַת מַשָּׂאוֹ״, מַשּׂאוֹי שֶׁיָּכוֹל לַעֲמוֹד בּוֹ, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: לָא דָּרְשִׁינַן ״תַּחַת מַשָּׂאוֹ״.

The Gemara rejects that proof: Perhaps it is with regard to the meaning of the phrase “under its burden” that they disagree, as Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that we interpret the phrase “under its burden” to mean: A burden that the animal can bear. And the Rabbis hold that we do not interpret the phrase “under its burden” in this manner.

תֵּדַע דְּצַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים לָאו דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, דְּקָתָנֵי רֵישָׁא: הָלַךְ וְיָשַׁב לוֹ וְאָמַר לוֹ הוֹאִיל וְעָלֶיךָ מִצְוָה לִפְרוֹק, פְּרוֹק פָּטוּר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר עִמּוֹ. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ צַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, מָה לִי אִיתֵיהּ לְמָרֵיהּ בַּהֲדֵיהּ, וּמָה לִי כִּי לֵיתֵיהּ לְמָרֵיהּ בַּהֲדֵיהּ?

The Gemara cites an additional proof: Know that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is not by Torah law, as it is taught in the former clause of the mishna: If the owner went, and sat, and said to a passerby: Since there is a mitzva incumbent upon you to unload the burden, unload it, the passerby is exempt, as it is stated: “You shall release it with him” (Exodus 23:5). And if it enters your mind that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, what is it to me if its owner is working with the passerby and what is it to me if its owner is not working with the passerby? The animal suffers in both cases.

לְעוֹלָם צַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, מִי סָבְרַתְּ פָּטוּר פָּטוּר לִגְמָרֵי? וְדִלְמָא פָּטוּר בְּחִנָּם, וְחַיָּיב בְּשָׂכָר. וְהָכִי קָאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא: כִּי אִיתֵיהּ לְמָרֵיהּ בַּהֲדֵיהּ – עֲבֵד גַּבֵּיהּ בְּחִנָּם, וְכִי לֵיתֵיהּ לְמָרֵיהּ בַּהֲדֵיהּ – עֲבֵד גַּבֵּיהּ בְּשָׂכָר, וּלְעוֹלָם צַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא.

The Gemara rejects that proof: Actually, one could say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law. And when the tanna exempts the passerby when the owner does not participate in unloading the burden, do you maintain that exempt means completely exempt? Perhaps it means that the passerby is exempt from unloading the burden for free, but is obligated to do so for remuneration; and this is what the Merciful One said: If its owner is working with the passerby, perform the unloading with him for free; and if its owner is not working with the passerby, perform the unloading for him for remuneration. And actually, the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law.

(סִימַן בֶּהֱמַת, בֶּהֱמַת, אוֹהֵב, שׂוֹנֵא, רַבְצָן).

The Gemara presents a mnemonic for a series of proposed proofs cited by the Gemara: Animal of; animal of; friend; enemy; collapser.

לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ: בֶּהֱמַת גּוֹי מִטַּפֵּל בָּהּ כְּבֶהֱמַת יִשְׂרָאֵל. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא צַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא – מִשּׁוּם הָכִי מִטַּפֵּל בָּהּ כְּבֶהֱמַת יִשְׂרָאֵל, אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ צַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים לָאו דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, אַמַּאי מִטַּפֵּל בָּהּ כְּבֶהֱמַת יִשְׂרָאֵל? הָתָם מִשּׁוּם אֵיבָה.

Let us say that a baraita supports Rava’s opinion that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law: If one encounters the animal of a gentile collapsed under its burden, he tends to it and unloads its burden, as he would the animal of a Jew. The Gemara reasons: Granted, if you say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, it is due to that reason that he tends to it as he would the animal of a Jew. But if you say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is not by Torah law, why does he tend to it as he would the animal of a Jew? The Gemara rejects the proof: There one tends to the animal due to enmity that would arise if gentiles see Jews assisting their own people and not gentiles. The obligation is not due to the requirement to prevent suffering of animals.

הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דְּקָתָנֵי: אִם הָיְתָה טְעוּנָה יֵין נֶסֶךְ – אֵין זָקוּק לָהּ. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא לָאו דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא – מִשּׁוּם הָכִי אֵין זָקוּק לָהּ, אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא – אַמַּאי אֵין זָקוּק לָהּ? הָכִי קָאָמַר: וּלְהַטְעִינָהּ יֵין נֶסֶךְ אֵין זָקוּק לָהּ.

So too, it is reasonable to explain the baraita in this manner, as it is taught in another baraita: If the animal of a gentile was loaded with wine used for a libation to idolatry, and the animal is collapsed under its burden, a Jew does not attend to it. Granted, if you say that the requirement to prevent suffering of animals is not by Torah law, it is due to that reason that he does not attend to it. But if you say that the obligation is by Torah law, why does he not attend to it; isn’t the animal suffering? The Gemara answers that this is what the tanna is saying: And to load the animal with wine used for a libation to idolatry, he does not attend to it. Loading an animal does not alleviate its suffering. Furthermore, the refusal of the Jew to handle the libation wine will not cause enmity, because he can explain that his religion precludes him from handling these materials.

תָּא שְׁמַע: בֶּהֱמַת גּוֹי וּמַשּׂאוֹי יִשְׂרָאֵל, ״וְחָדַלְתָּ״. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ צַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, אַמַּאי ״וְחָדַלְתָּ״? ״עָזֹב תַּעֲזֹב״ מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! לְעוֹלָם צַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, הָתָם בִּטְעִינָה.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita: If one encounters the animal of a gentile collapsed under the burden of a Jew, he may refuse to unload the burden, as it is written: “If you see the donkey of him that hates you collapsed under its burden, you shall forgo passing him by; you shall release it with him” (Exodus 23:5). By employing the phrase “you shall forgo,” the verse indicates that there are circumstances in which one may forgo unloading the animal. The Gemara reasons: And if you say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, why is there the option of: “You shall forgo”? The Torah should have commanded only: “You shall release it with him.” The Gemara answers: Actually, say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, and there the baraita is referring to a case of loading, where suffering of animals is not a factor.

אִי הָכִי, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: בֶּהֱמַת יִשְׂרָאֵל וּמַשּׂאוֹי גּוֹי ״עָזֹב תַּעֲזֹב״. וְאִי בִּטְעִינָה, אַמַּאי ״עָזֹב תַּעֲזֹב״? מִשּׁוּם צַעֲרָא דְּיִשְׂרָאֵל.

The Gemara asks: If so, say the latter clause of the baraita: With regard to a case involving the animal of a Jew collapsed under the burden of a gentile, it is written: “You shall release it.” And if the baraita is referring to a case of loading, where suffering of animals is not a factor, why does the baraita state: “You shall release it”? The Gemara answers: It is because in that case, there is suffering of the Jew, who is delayed while waiting for the animal to be loaded.

אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ רֵישָׁא נָמֵי! רֵישָׁא בְּחַמָּר גּוֹי סֵיפָא בְּחַמָּר יִשְׂרָאֵל. מַאי פָּסְקַתְּ? סְתָמָא דְּמִלְּתָא אִינִישׁ בָּתַר חֲמָרֵיהּ אָזֵיל.

The Gemara asks: If so, then the halakha should be the same even in the first clause. Why is there no requirement to prevent the suffering of the Jewish partner in that case? The Gemara answers: The ruling of the first clause is stated with regard to a gentile donkey driver, and the Jewish owner of the burden is absent. The ruling of the latter clause is stated with regard to a Jewish donkey driver and one is obligated to prevent his suffering. The Gemara asks: On what basis did you arrive at this definitive assertion that the animal of a Jew is driven by that Jew and the animal of a gentile is driven by that gentile? The Gemara answers: The typical state of matters is that a person follows his donkey. The first clause addressed the case of a gentile’s donkey, so presumably its driver is gentile. The latter clause addressed the case of a Jew’s donkey, so presumably its driver is a Jew.

וְהָא ״וְחָדַלְתָּ״ וְ״עָזֹב תַּעֲזֹב״ בִּפְרִיקָה הוּא דִּכְתִיבִי!

The Gemara questions the explanation that the baraita is referring to cases involving loading. But isn’t it with regard to unloading that the phrases cited in the baraita: “You shall forgo passing him by,” and: “You shall release it,” are written?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי הִיא, דְּאָמַר: צַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים לָאו דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא.

The Gemara answers that he said to him: Indeed, the fact that one need not unload the burden from the donkey in the first clause of the baraita indicates that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is not by Torah law. In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is not by Torah law. That is the minority opinion, as the Rabbis disagree.

תָּא שְׁמַע: אוֹהֵב לִפְרוֹק וְשׂוֹנֵא לִטְעוֹן – מִצְוָה בְּשׂוֹנֵא, כְּדֵי לָכוֹף אֶת יִצְרוֹ. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ צַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, הָא עֲדִיף לֵיהּ? אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי, כְּדֵי לָכוֹף אֶת יִצְרוֹ עָדִיף.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita: If one encounters a friend whose animal collapsed and it is necessary to unload its burden, and one also encounters an enemy who needs assistance to load a burden onto his animal, the mitzva is to assist the enemy, in order to subjugate one’s evil inclination. The Gemara reasons: And if it enters your mind that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, that option, to unload his friend’s animal, is the preferable course of action for him. The Gemara answers: Even if the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, even so, loading his enemy’s animal in order to subjugate his evil inclination is preferable.

תָּא שְׁמַע: שׂוֹנֵא שֶׁאָמְרוּ – שׂוֹנֵא יִשְׂרָאֵל וְלֹא שׂוֹנֵא אוּמּוֹת הָעוֹלָם. אִי אָמְרַתְּ צַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, מָה לִי שׂוֹנֵא יִשְׂרָאֵל וּמָה לִי שׂוֹנֵא אוּמּוֹת הָעוֹלָם?

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita. The enemy with regard to which they stated the halakha that one must assist with his animal is a Jewish enemy and not a gentile enemy. The Gemara asks: If you say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, what is it to me if it is a Jewish enemy and what is it to me if it is a gentile enemy? In either case, failure to unload the burden will cause the animal suffering.

מִי סָבְרַתְּ אַשּׂוֹנֵא דִקְרָא קָאֵי? אַשּׂוֹנֵא דְמַתְנִיתִין קָאֵי.

The Gemara answers: Do you maintain that the reference in the baraita to an enemy applies to the enemy mentioned in the verse: “If you see the donkey of him that hates you collapsed under its burden…you shall release it with him”? It applies to the enemy mentioned in the baraita cited above, in which the tanna taught that loading a burden onto an enemy’s animal is preferable to unloading a burden from a friend’s animal.

תָּא שְׁמַע:

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita: