וּמְקוֹמוֹ מוּשְׂכָּר לוֹ. וְעִישּׂוּר אַחֵר שֶׁאֲנִי עָתִיד לָמוֹד, נָתוּן לַעֲקִיבָא בֶּן יוֹסֵף, כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּזְכֶּה בּוֹ לַעֲנִיִּים, וּמְקוֹמוֹ מוּשְׂכָּר לוֹ.

and the place of the tithe is rented to him. Rabbi Yehoshua paid him a token sum to rent the field, which presumably became the equivalent of his courtyard, and thereby acquired the tithe. And another one-tenth that I will measure out in the future and separate from my produce as the poor man’s tithe is given to Akiva ben Yosef so that he will acquire it for the poor, and its place is rented to him.

וְכִי רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא בְּצַד שָׂדֵהוּ שֶׁל רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל הָיוּ עוֹמְדִין?

Rabbi Abba continued: But were Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva standing next to Rabban Gamliel’s field then? All of them were on the ship. Apparently, one’s courtyard effects acquisition for him even when he is not standing next to it.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: דָּמֵי הַאי מֵרַבָּנַן כִּדְלָא גָּמְרִי אִינָשֵׁי שְׁמַעְתָּא.

Ulla said to him: This one of the Sages seems like one who has not studied halakha. Ulla dismissed the question entirely, as he deemed it unworthy of consideration.

כִּי אֲתָא לְסוּרָא אֲמַר לְהוּ: הָכִי אָמַר עוּלָּא וְהָכִי אוֹתְבִיתֵיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ הָהוּא מֵרַבָּנַן: רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל מִטַּלְטְלֵי אַגַּב מְקַרְקְעֵי הִקְנָה לָהֶם. רַבִּי זֵירָא קַבְּלַהּ, רַבִּי אַבָּא לָא קַבְּלַהּ.

When Rabbi Abba came to Sura, he related the discussion to the local scholars, saying to them: This is what Ulla said, and this is how I challenged him. One of the Sages said to him: Rabban Gamliel transferred ownership of the movable property, the tithes, to them by means of renting them the land. The transaction concerning the tithes was effected not by causing the location of the produce to become the equivalent of a courtyard belonging to Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva, but rather by employing the principle that movable property can be acquired together with the acquisition of land. The Gemara comments: Rabbi Zeira accepted this response to Rabbi Abba’s objection, but Rabbi Abba did not accept it.

אָמַר רָבָא: שַׁפִּיר עֲבַיד דְּלָא קַבְּלַהּ, וְכִי לֹא הָיָה לָהֶם סוּדָר לִקְנוֹת מִמֶּנּוּ בַּחֲלִיפִין? אֶלָּא טוֹבַת הֲנָאָה אֵינָהּ מָמוֹן לִקְנוֹת מִמֶּנּוּ בַּחֲלִיפִין. הָכָא נָמֵי טוֹבַת הֲנָאָה אֵינָהּ מָמוֹן לִקְנוֹת עַל גַּבֵּי קַרְקַע.

Rava said: Rabbi Abba did well by not accepting this response, because if Rabban Gamliel had intended to transfer his ownership of the tithes to Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva, did they not have a cloth with which to acquire the tithes from him by means of a symbolic exchange? They could have acquired the tithes through symbolic exchange without renting the land. Rather, clearly the tithes were not considered the property of Rabban Gamliel, as he owned only the benefit of discretion, i.e., the benefit accrued from the option of giving the tithes to whichever Levite or poor person that he chose, and such benefit is not considered property that can be acquired by means of a symbolic exchange. Here, too, the transaction was clearly effected by means of a courtyard, as benefit of discretion is not property that can be acquired by means of acquiring land. Therefore, Rabbi Abba’s explanation must be correct, and one’s courtyard effects acquisition for him even when he is not standing next to it.

וְלָא הִיא, מַתְּנוֹת כְּהוּנָּה נְתִינָה כְּתִיבָא בְּהוּ. חֲלִיפִין, דֶּרֶךְ מִקָּח וּמִמְכָּר הוּא. מִטַּלְטְלִין אַגַּב מִקַּרְקַע, נְתִינָה אַלִּימְתָּא הִיא.

The Gemara rejects Rava’s reasoning: But that is not so. With regard to gifts to which members of the priesthood are entitled, and similarly with regard to tithes that are given to Levites and to the poor, the concept of giving is written in the Torah: “And have given it to the Levite, to the stranger, to the fatherless, and to the widow” (Deuteronomy 26:12). These gifts must be given and not sold or bartered. Therefore, since exchange is a form of buying and selling, it is an inappropriate mode of acquisition with regard to tithes. By contrast, transferring ownership of movable property by means of transferring ownership of land is a powerful form of giving. Consequently, Rabban Gamliel could not give them the tithes by means of a symbolic exchange using a cloth, but instead had to give it to them along with land. Therefore, since the transaction was not effected by means of a courtyard, it poses no difficulty to Ulla’s opinion.

רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: דַּעַת אַחֶרֶת מַקְנָה אוֹתָן שָׁאנֵי.

Rav Pappa said: Even if Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva acquired the tithes by means of a courtyard, this poses no difficulty to Ulla’s opinion. Since the tithes were not ownerless items, but rather another mind, i.e., Rabban Gamliel, transferred their ownership to Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva, it is different, and the recipients did not need to stand next to the courtyard.

וּמְנָא תֵּימְרַאּ – דִּתְנַן: רָאָה אוֹתָן רָצִין אַחַר הַמְּצִיאָה כּוּ׳, וְאָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: וְהוּא שֶׁרָץ אַחֲרֵיהֶן וּמַגִּיעָן. וּבָעֵי רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה, בְּמַתָּנָה הֵיאַךְ? קַבְּלַהּ מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי אַבָּא בַּר כָּהֲנָא אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁרָץ אַחֲרֵיהֶן וְאֵין מַגִּיעָן. מַאי טַעְמָא – לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּדַעַת אַחֶרֶת מַקְנָה אוֹתָן שָׁאנֵי?!

And from where do you state this distinction? As we learned in the mishna: If one saw people running after a found ownerless animal, and said: My field has effected acquisition of this animal for me, it has effected acquisition of it for him. And Rabbi Yirmeya says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says that this halakha is true only in a case where he would be able to run after them and catch them. And Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: Does one acquire animals that are given to him as a gift in such a scenario? Rabbi Abba bar Kahana accepted the premise of the dilemma of Rabbi Yirmeya, and ruled that in the case of a gift one acquires the animals even if he would not be able to run after them and catch them. What is the reason for this distinction? Is it not because when another mind transfers their ownership, the halakha is different, in that the courtyard effects acquisition of the items with fewer limitations? This supports Rav Pappa’s explanation.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב שִׁימִי לְרַב פָּפָּא: הֲרֵי גֵּט, דְּדַעַת אַחֶרֶת – מַקְנָה אוֹתָהּ, וְאָמַר עוּלָּא: וְהוּא שֶׁעוֹמֶדֶת בְּצַד בֵּיתָהּ אוֹ בְּצַד חֲצֵרָהּ. שָׁאנֵי גֵּט דְּאִיתֵיהּ בְּעַל כׇּרְחָהּ.

Rav Shimi said to Rav Pappa: But what about the case of a bill of divorce, where another mind, the husband, transfers its ownership to the wife, and nevertheless Ulla says with regard to one who threw a bill of divorce into his wife’s house or courtyard: But it is a valid divorce only if she is standing next to her house or next to her courtyard? Rav Pappa responded: A bill of divorce is different, as it is possible to give it to one’s wife even against her will.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִידִי: וְלָאו קַל וָחוֹמֶר הוּא – וּמָה גֵּט דְּאִיתֵיהּ בְּעַל כׇּרְחָהּ, אִי עוֹמֶדֶת בְּצַד בֵּיתָהּ וּבְצַד חֲצֵרָהּ – אִין, אִי לָא – לָא. מַתָּנָה דְּמִדַּעְתֵּיהּ לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן!

Rav Sheshet, son of Rav Idi, objects to this response: But is it not an a fortiori inference? If in the case of a bill of divorce, which is valid even if it is given to the wife against her will, nevertheless if she is standing next to her house or next to her courtyard she does acquire the bill of divorce, and if not she does not acquire it, then in the case of a gift, which one can receive only willingly, is it not all the more so correct that the recipient must be next to his courtyard for the transaction to take effect?

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי:

Rather, Rav Ashi said that the distinction between the cases of a gift and a bill of divorce should be explained as follows: